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Included in the legacy which Martha ("Mother") Shipton left
to the world upon her death in 1561 was the prophecythat"Carriages
without horses shall go, and accidents fill the world with woe."' The
twentieth century has seen the fulfillment of this prophecy, and, in a
certain sense, observed that fulfillment by recording the one-mil-
lionth automobile accident fatality on December 23, 1951.2 This an-
niversary was celebrated despite the best efforts of safety organiza-
tions, law enforcement agencies, legislators, insurance carriers, au-
tomobile organizations, and the general public to reverse the rising
trend of accident statistics. As part of the fight to make the high-
ways safe, great stress has been placed upon the contribution
which legislation, both civil and penal, can make toward the ulti-
mate solution of the problem of automobile accidents. The purpose
of including traffic rules in the criminal codes of the state law is ob-
vious. In precisely the same way that other criminal laws deter other
types of conduct dangerous to the public safety, motor vehicle traf-
fic regulations compel the usage of driving practices which are
thought necessary to decrease the likelihood of accidents. This
deterrent effect upon dangerous driving is clear in theory and
is becoming steadily more effective in practice as the science of traf-
fic law enforcement progresses. 3
There is, however, need for attention to the civil penalties
which have been created to strengthen the defense of the community
against dangerous driving. Several types of legislation have been
proposed, and annually there is competition among them for adop-
tion by state legislatures. Inevitably discussion of these proposals
turns, in varying degrees, to the good that such laws, if enacted,
will do toward the solution of the problem of automobile accidents.
Underlying each, therefore, is the assumption that civil penalties or
administrative procedures have a deterrent effect upon dangerous
driving.
Yet the deterrent effect which these civil penalties have upon
dangerous driving is almost never analyzed and explained. Every-
one assumes that deterrents are at work in such laws, but no
* Legislative Counsel, American Automobile Association; Member, Amer-
ican Bar Association; Member of National Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws.
I BAnTLETr'S FAm sm.I QuoTAroNs, (N.Y., 1940), p. 940.
2 National Safety Council.
3 Halsey, Accident Prevention vs. Accident Cause, 36 J. Cm. L. & Cans-
INOLOGY 349 (January 1946).
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one says how or to what extent they are effective. It would seem
that the legislative air would be considerably cleared if the various
types of civil procedures and penalties were compared and evalu-
ated with respect to their effectiveness in this respect. The forego-
ing parts of this symposium have dealt with tort law practice and
legislation which operates to modify the common law rule of liabil-
ity in cases of injuries due to automobile accidents. It is fitting, how-
ever, to recognize that the "social problem" of compensation for ac-
cident victims is ultimately due to the fact that certain types of be-
havior cause accidents, and the proportions of the accident victim
compensation problem are directly correlated to the extent with
which accident-causing behavior is widespread. In this way the
problem of deterring dangerous driving practices becomes a matter
which should command the most thoughtful attention of all who
deal with the law.
THE ROLE OF IGmVAY SAFETY IN THE LAW OF TORTS.
At the outset it should be noted that as the law of torts has de-
veloped it has seemed to become less and less concerned with the
matter of public safety. In its Anglo-Saxon origin, the common law
rule fixing liability for civil wrongs expressed the undiscriminating
impulse for revenge which naturally came from the victim, and also
provided a rough-shod deterrent upon dangerous activities which
arose from the same fear of revenge. 4 The tariffs of payments pre-
scribed in the Anglo-Saxon dooms served the dual purpose of work-
ing for the preservation of order in the community and the compen-
sation of the person wrongfully harmed. With the development of
effective government, however, this dual concern of tort law has na-
turally disappeared, and the rules of civil liability have become in-
creasingly preoccupied with making whole the tort victim's losses.
This tendency has been encouraged by the widespread use of insur-
ance and has led most of modern thinking about tortious conduct to
center around the question of how the victim's losses should be shift-
ed from his own shoulders to a broader base. Nowadays nothing is
said in court decisions about the rehabilitation of the tort-feasor as
a result of his having to pay for his negligence. And even the recog-
nition of moral wrongdoing as a factor in determining liability is, in
these times, under heavy assult in deference to "the social problem"
which accidental injuries are said to create.s The first point to no-
4 PoTm, AN HiSTOmCAL IRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LAW, (London, 1932),
p. 295; Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History. 3 SzcCT ES-
SAYS ON ANGLo-Am C=cA LEGAL HisTORy, p. 474 (Boston, 1909).
S See for example: James, Accident Liability, 55 YAix L.J. 365 (February
1940); Automobile Accident Compulsory Insurance Reconsidered, 1953 ILL. L.
FORUM 263; McNiece & Thornton, Automobile Accident Prevention and Corn-
pensation, 27 N.Y.U.L. REv. 585 (1952).
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tice, therefore, is that in the process of its development, the law of
torts apparently has relegated to a very minor role that portion of
its influence which operates to prevent the occurrence of dangerous
conduct or deter its repetition. Most people, lawyers and laymen
alike, today think of safety as a "matter for the police."
This tendency can be plainly seen in the history of automobile
accident litigation. This first fatal automobile accident is said to
have occurred in 1896.6 Looking at events in the light of the times,
it is not unexpected that the law continued to be preoccupied with
the job of determining which party should bear the cost of the in-
jury and making the injured plaintiff whole. The fact than an auto-
mobile was involved was not particularly significant. The horseless
carriage appeared analogous to the horse-drawn carriage; the pro-
cedure most suitable for determining civil liability in either case ap-
peared to be the same; there was no reason to read into the case a
significance beyond what appeared from a surface inspection. If the
negligent defendant happened to be chastened by having to pay
damages for his action, so much the better for the community in
which he would continue to live. But no one seriously contended
that the rehabilitation of the tortious wrongdoer was a concern of
the law of torts.
This leads to a second observation about the common law back-
ground of the types of legislation which has been applied to the
problem of automobile accidents and which are the subject of this
symposium: There has been no serious attempt to create a rule of
absolute tort liabilty for cases of automobile accident injury and
property damage. This is true despite the fact that in other types of
tortious conduct, the rule of absolute liability has been followed by
the courts.7 Here one thinks of the cases involving dynamite, elec-
tricity and gas, and certain activities regarded in the light of the
times as "ultrahazardous" or "inherently dangerous." Yet early in
the process of developing doctrine applicable to automobiles, the
courts rejected the notion that a driver's liability should be abso-
lute, and, instead, based their reasoning on the assumption that lia-
bility should be measured by reference to the standard of due care
under the circumstances.3 Liability for fault continues to be the
rule today where automobiles are concerned, despite the fact that
statutory strict liability has been specifically extended to many
types of industrial accidents, railroad and aircraft accidents, and
situations involving foods, drugs, and liquids.
The tendencies just described present a contradiction when
placed in the context of modern common law automobile accident
6 N.Y. DAm), Thmum-N, May 31, 1896. Cited in Kane, J. N., Famous First
Facts, (N.Y., 1950).
7 PROssEr, TORTS, pp. 446, 466. (1941).
8 Lewis v. Amorous, 3 Ga. App. 50, 59 S.E. 338 (1907).
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litigation. On one hand, adherence to the theory of "liability for
fault" would indicate that moral wrongdoing ought to be singled
out for punishment with a consequent chastening of the wrong-
doer's character. On the other hand, there appears to be a preoc-
cupation with the fate of the victim rather than the fault of the tort-
feasor, even when the whole proceeding of the litigation is cast in
the form of a common law action based on liability for negligence.
In such a situation as this one, any effort of the court to make the
finding of liability reach the character of the wrongdoer and leave
there a mark which will serve as a continuing reminder of the folly
of his recklessness is diluted and ineffective. The moral lesson for
the tort-feasor is lost amid a mass of words dealing with the social
and economic aspects of the victim's individual problem.
Moreover, the lesson which comes from litigation comes too
late in the sense that it is too far removed from the occurrence of
the accident. Years of delay, which are not uncommon where cases
are set for jury trial, 9 insulate the minds of the parties to the impact
of the court's decision when it is eventually pronounced, with the
result that regardless of the theory of liability adopted the proc-
ess of litigation has largely become meaningless to the layman and
has passed into the hands of a handful of highly skilled and or-
ganized professionals who follow the trends of the courts' decisions
as a means of perfecting their own art.
Finally, the great extent to which liability insurance is held
probably operates to rinimize the role of highway safety in the
process of litigating automobile accident cases. Direct evidence of
the effect of insurance upon highway safety is difficult to isolate,'0
but there is a certain irrefutable logic in the often-heard observation
that when an individual must pay for his negligence out of his own
pocket the experience is more personal than when his insurance
company pays his liability for him.
These considerations indicate why one is not encouraged to
look to the process of tort claim litigation for any significant contri-
bution toward the promotion of highway safety. The process simply
is not able, under present. conditions, to bring its effect to bear
strongly enough upon the persons in whose hands the future record
of highway accident ultimately rests. Litigation, whether carried
on under the "fault theory" or some modification of it, does not
personalize the issue sufficiently to operate as an effective deter-
rent to future dangerous driving. Therefore, the attempt to make
civil penalties supplement the criminal law in promoting highway
safety has found its best expression in legislation and administrative
9 N.Y. Tmns, February 8, 1954, citing a survey conducted by the N.Y. State
Judicial Council.
10James, supra note 5, p. 557.
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licensing procedures which overcome the disadvantage of indi-
rectness, remoteness, and slowness of operation. It is in this form of
law that chief reliance for solving the automobile accident prob-
lem now rests.
Tm PsYcHoLoGY OF DRIVING
Before considering the effectiveness of these laws, mention
should be made of certain psychological factors involved in driving.
These factors serve to outline the area of behavior in which these
laws must work. Enough is known about the process of operating
a motor vehicle to say that it is not a series of entirely reflex actions.
But, on the other hand, it is not such a complex operation as to re-
quire constant attention and a series of decisions arising from the
highest levels of conscious thought. The focal point of the driver's
attention is (or should be) the road situation ahead of him. The
motorist is conscious of his own place in this road situation and the
effect of regulating his speed and direction upon his place in that
situation. Within the field of this "total road situation" the driver
relates himself to other objects upon the basis of the meaning they
have for him in the task he is performing."
For example, a driver moving along a street sees another car
parked on the right side of the road one hundred yards ahead.
He is conscious of the car, but not its make, its license number,
whether it is old or new, or whether there is anyone in the car.
This car has no meaning for him except that it is a thing to be
passed as he moves down the street. It remains in his marginal
consciousness until it is passed. But, let this parked car have a
driver in it who suddenly starts the car and pulls out into traffic
ahead. This movement by the car which had previously been
parked alters the road situation, and, in response to this new devel-
opment, the driver of the oncoming car slows the speed of his own
vehicle or changes his course in order to avoid a rear end collision.
But in so doing, the driver does not concentrate his attention on
the car which has just entered the flow of traffic ahead of him for
more than a brief moment, if, indeed, he ever permits it to domi-
nate his attention at all. Throughout the series of acts which are
performed to adjust the speed and direction of his vehicle to cope
with the entry of a new element into the total road situation, the
driver remains aware of a vast number of other matters with re-
spect to which the driver must and does maintain a particular re-
lationship.
In this way driving never consists entirely of a series of stimu-
11 The term "total road situation" originates with Dr. W. J. Van Lennep
in his excellent description of the mental processes of motor vehicle drivers.
See his Psychological Factors in Driving, 6 Tarpic QUARTERLY 483 (October
1952).
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lus reactions in the sense that psychologists have frequently de-
scribed. The attention of the driver to the road situation is not a
sort of searchlight thrown upon things in the environment in order
to better examine them. The driver must develop a widely spread
attention capable of having its real "center of gravity" some 500
yards ahead, but which also permits him constantly to be aware of
what is immediately in front of him and to initiate and execute sim-
ple movements and changes of speed without changing this center
of attention.
Dr. Herbert Stack has described driving as "a combination of
two types of actions. The first are automatic acts, such as shifting
gears, avoiding obstacles and the like. The second, and by far the
more important, are the acts involving problems and decision; such
as: Should I attempt to pass the car ahead? What does that octagon-
al sign mean? What does the driver ahead propose to do by that
hand signal? Do I have the right-of-way at this intersection? These
and dozens of other problems arise, several in each mile we travel
The decisions we make determine the kind of driver we are."' 2
Traffic laws have a relationship to the psychology of driving
since they function as a frame-work by which the driver gives order
to the various objects which he perceived and must deal with as
he moves down the road in his vehicle. Through traffic laws, the
road and traffic conditions become part of an orderly pattern and the
driver's task of decision as to what he shall do with respect to them
is made easier.
These psychological factors involved in driving are important
when the causes of accidents are studied. And, what is perhaps
more important, they indicate the field of human behavior which
must be dealt with by any legislation which is designed to deter
dangerous driving and promote highway safety. This behavior
which is characteristic of driving would seem to be a difficult one
to reach by the procedures customarily utilized in legislation. It
has none of the "intent" which is an essential element of a crime,
and it generally lacks the element of deliberate calculation which is
involved in most other situations where "risks" are taken in connec-
tion with the use of property. The inescapable fact is that precisely
because the driver does not always have to "think before he acts"
much of the process of driving is beyond the range of the deter-
rent effect of statutory rules.
THM CAUSE OF AccmENTs
If, as has just been suggested, the processes of so-called "nor-
mal driving" are largely beyond the ready reach of legislative man-
date, it would seem that the situation is even worse when one con-
siders the chances of effectively legislating away those causes of
12 Stack, What Makes Drivers Act That Way? 1 TRAic QuARTmLy 29, 31
(January 1947).
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accidents which frequently are due to abnormal psychological re-
sponses to changes in the road situation. It is generally accepted that
roughly 70 per cent of all accidents are caused by unsafe driv-
ing.13 In addition, the driver or owner must accept responsibility
for a further portion of the total number of accidents traceable to
mechanical defects which but for his own carelessness or procras-
tination would have been avoided. This indicates in rough terms
how great an improvement in the highway accident record could be
expected if legislative or administrative standards of safe driving
could be made effective.
To take advantage of this opportunity for improvement is, how-
ever, another matter. Many factors may operate in the case of an
individual driver to impair a "normal" reaction on his part to the
road situation around him.
According to Dr. Van Lennep, there are, aside from bodily de-
fects and lack of routine, three large groups of factors to be pointed
out as important personal factors which determine whether a per-
son is a safe or dangerous driver.14 They are (a) the aptitude of
the driver, (b) the disposition of the driver, and (c) faulty de-
cisions of all kinds made in the process of driving. Among the apti-
tude factors, uneven temperament plays a leading role. An over-
confident and impetuous driver has a tendency to move too di-
rectly toward his goal without regard for the route prescribed by
traffic rules. In a curve to the left, for example, he tends to cut
it short by using the left hand side of the road instead of the right.
In another type of driver, a predisposition to panic frequently may
gain the upper hand. When this occurs, the driver removes himself,
psychologically speaking, from the traffic situation of which he is a
part, and permits the circumstances to master him instead of his
mastering the circumstances by making changes suggested by a
foreseeing plan of operation. Perhaps the most common aptitude
weakness which leads to personal mistakes in traffic situations,
however, is a failure of the driver's attention. Rapid realization of
the significance of changes in the road situation is essential for
safe driving. Where this is entirely lacking, or where there is
momentary lapse of attention to the total road situation, the driver
is in danger. The common remark that "It just loomed up from
out of nowhere" generally evokes the equally common, but futile,
answer, "You must not have been paying attention."
It is also suggested that the degree to which a feeling of social
responsibility has been developed in a driver is related to his
aptitude for safe driving. Whether this feeling is itself an aptitude
or whether it exists separately as a factor conditioning the expres-
13 Van Lennep, supra note 11 at p. 492 estimates 70 percent; Stack, supra
note 12, p. 30 estimates 69 percent.
14 Van Lennep, supra note 12, p. 30.
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sion of aptitudes is difficult to say. Yet, it is suggested that a
driver whose strong aggressive tendencies are not controlled by
an equally strong feeling of responsibility toward others is clearly
a menace to the highways.
As to the second group of personal faults which have been
called "disposition," one must often trace the controlling factors
back to physiological origins. A driver may be perfectly capable
of giving proper attention to his driving, but he may not do so be-
cause he is overtired and lackadaisical or, equally possible, because
emotional disturbances interfere with his normally satisfactory abil-
ity to respond to the road situation. Morever, the driver who realizes
this deficiency and attempts to compensate by forced attention is
equally dangerous, for in the forced focusing of attention on certain
objects others may be completely ignored.
Finally, with respect to faulty decisions, it is impossible to class-
ify all of them under common headings. Research in the field of
driver testing has produced impressive statistics on such matters as
the ability of drivers to correctly estimate speed and distance. The
marked lack of this ability in a large percentage of drivers becomes
significant when it is realized how very many decisions must con-
stantly be made on the basis of this ability whenever a car is
moving in traffic.
Other authorities have classified the psychological factors in-
volved in accidents with slightly different descriptive terms, but
essentially there is common agreement that the root causes of ac-
cidents due to personal faults lie deeply buried in the psychological
and physiological make-up of the individual driver.1 s
Carrying this subject further, it is significant to note also that
a certain percentage of drivers are "accident-prone," and can be
counted on to become involved repeatedly in accidents. Nation-
wide statistics are not available, but certain state studies have yield-
ed startling results. A Connecticut study,16 for example, showed that
4 per cent of the drivers were responsible for 36 per cent of all ac-
cidents, many of these drivers having from 4 to 8 accidents a year
1S See generally DE SILVA, WHY WE HAvE Au omoaR AccimDas, (N.Y.,
1942) c. 5; Awnuc= AUTOOBILE AssocIATIoN, SPORTSmA E DRiVma, (Wash-
ington, 1953), 7; James and Dickinson, Accident Proneness and Accident Law,
63 HARv. L. REv. 769, 772(1950). See also Burch, Responsibilities of Highways
in Highway Accidents, 1 TRAFc QUATRI.Y 373 (October 1947); Neale, High-
way Landscaping Influences Traffic Operation and Safety, 3 TRAmc QuARm-
Ly 14 (January 1949); McMonagle, Effect of Roadside Features on Traffic Ac-
cidents, TRAuc QuAREEmY 229 (April 1952); Holmes, Automobile speeds,
current and post war, 35 J. Cam. L. & CRnMOLOGY 189 (September 1944);
Accident Proneness, 115 JusT. P. 290,614 (1951).
1 6 Described and analyzed in HousE Doc. No. 462, 75m CONGRESS, 3D Sm-
sioN, Motor Vehicle Traffic Conditions in the United States, Pt. 6, the Accident-
Prone Driver, passim.
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while other motorists in the state, covering the same mileage,
would go 5 to 10 years without a reportable accident. That the con-
tinued presence of "accident-prone" drivers on the public highways
creates a significant obstacle to the promotion of highway safety
is obvious. Yet, in the light of what is known about the causes of
accidents and "accident-proneness," the problem of devising civil
penalties which are capable of acting as effective deterrents to ac-
cident-causing behavior appears difficult indeed.17
This difficulty, once recognized, becomes significant when the
effectiveness of legislation is being appraised. One is forced to
doubt seriously whether statutory standards of behavior can ever
be expected to "get through" to the driver and reach the level of
consciousness at which his accident-causing driving habits are
formed. The existence of a statutory standard of safe conduct
means nothing to a driver whose skills and attitudes are not well
enough developed to permit him to utilize that standard in his own
personal conduct; the fact that failure to adhere to the standard is
subject to a penalty does nothing to rehabilitate that driver's acci-
dent-proneness. The accident-prone driver will repeat his dangerous
driving as long as he is allowed to drive and regardless of how many
times he is subjected to penalties.
Turning from the special case of the accident-prone driver to
the normally careful driver, it may be suggested that even he, in
most of his driving operations, acts without conscious reference to
statutory standards of safe driving. His usual driving speed, for
example, is determined by habit and traffic flow; and if he drives
habitually in excess of the speed limit, the driver can only correct
it by giving forced attention to the matter all the while he is on the
road. This typically happens when the driver thinks he may be
observed by a police officer, and does not happen when the dan-
ger of arrest becomes remote. And, this, it may be suggested, hap-
pens to "the best of people," whose intentions are good, but whose
mechanical driving skill permits them to operate their vehicle large-
ly by habitual actions, and who, accordingly, do not constantly
watch themselves as they drive.
FINANcIAL OR "SAF-z" RESPONSIBILITY LAWS.
Turning to a comparison of the various types of legislation
that have been adopted in efforts to attack the problem of reducing
highway accidents and assuring relief to accident victims, the type
of law which has had the greatest appeal among the states is the
Financial Responsibility or "Safety-Responsibility" Act.18 The fre-
17 James and Dickinson, supra note 15, p. 775.
18 Some form of Financial Responsibility or Safety-Responsibility Act has
been enacted in all States of the Union and in the Canadian Provinces of Al-
berta, British Columbia, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Newfoundland, and Nova
Scotia.
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quent use of the latter term as the short title of the law indicates
the dual purpose which the act purports to serve.19 Operating on
the assumption that the great bulk of the accidents are caused by
a definitely ascertainable group of reckless and accident-prone
drivers, this legislation seeks to eliminate such accident-causing
group from the highways, and, with respect to all motorists gen-
erally, to encourage voluntary maintenance of a minimum level of
financial responsibility for damage resulting from accidents. In its
early form, the Safety-Responsibility Act became effective upon
the conviction for certain serious violations or failure to satisfy a
judgment arising out of a motor vehicle accident. This was found
to be ineffective because application of the law depended largely
upon the injured party's initiating judicial proceedings to prove lia-
bility on the part of the other person involved in the accident, and
experience showed that few claimants would take the trouble to
sue for a judgment-proof tort-feasor.20 As a result, the law inspired
neither respect and confidence in the victim nor fear in the wrong-
doer. Eventually, therefore, the law was perfected by requiring
additionally that in the event of an accident all parties immediately
must prove their ability to meet certain minimum amounts of lia-
bility which might thereafter be assessed against them. This so-
called "security-type" law overcame the original obstacles which
had impaired its effectiveness and now has become the basic type
of motorist liability law in all but three states. The typical opera-
tion of this type of law is described elsewhere in this symposium.2 '
Prior to the development of the security-type law financial respon-
sibility legislation observers generally agreed that it contributed very
little toward the promotion of highway safety.22 It was pointed out
that the procedure for segregating the bad driver and following up
such segregation with suspension of driving privileges was too cum-
bersome to be really effective. In their direct effect, therefore,
these laws did not go beyond what already existed in the driver
licensing laws in the way of bases for eliminating dangerous driv-
19
"Security-type" laws are in force in 44 of the several States, Dis-
trict of Columbia, and in the Canadian Provinces noted above: In Massachu-
setts, a judgment-type law applies to liability for property damage. Kansas
and South Dakota have "judgment-type laws" for liability due to death, per-
sonal injury and property damage. New Mexico requires "future-proof" fol-
lowing certain types of convictions and unsatisfied judgments. AuMcAm Au-
TomoBur AssocIATioN, DIGEST oF MOTOR VmcLE LAWS (1954), passim.
20OAmmicAN AuTou OBILE AssocIrATio, SAFEr-REsPONsrIBmry BiL (1952),
p. iv.
21 See Crunelle, The Ohio Safety Responsibility Law, infra p. 177.
22 Feinsinger, The Operation of Financial Responsibility Laws, 3 LAw &
CoNT. PRoB. 519, 522 (1936); DE SrvA, supra note 15, pp. 211-213.
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ers from the highways.23 Moreover, the indirect promotion of high-
way safety through the growth of "social responsibility" incidental
to financial responsibility was not significant. Safety-responsibility
laws which did not have the security feature almost invariably
failed to induce more than three out of four car owners to obtain
insurance.
24
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL MOTOR VEHICLES INSURED, 1950, BY STATES
Percentage Types of Financial Responsibility Law
Types la Types 2b Types 3c Type 4d
90 or over District of Delaware, Maryland New Hampshire Massachusetts
(8 states) Columbia Virginia, Washington New York
80-89 California, Colorado Indiana(14 states) Connecticut, Illinois Maine
Iowa, Ohio Michigan
Pennsylvania, Wiscon. New Jersey
OregonVermont
50-79 Kansas Arizona Idaho Florida(20 states) Missouri Kentucy, Minnesota
New Mexico Nebraska, Nevada
N. Carolina N. Dakota, Oklahoma
S. Dakota Rhode Island, Tennessee
Texas, Utah
West VirginiaWyoming
Less than 50e Arkansas Alabama, Georgia(7 states) Louisiana, MIss
I _ Montana, S._Carolina
The advent of the security-type Safety-Responsibility Act in
23 Feinsinger, mbid., writing in 1936, suggested that "financial responsibility
laws may perhaps perfect the scheme of suspension and revocation and do
generally add judgments thereto, but the procedure of suspension and revo-
cation as segregation as safety measure could proceed as well if not better with-
'out the requirement of proof: for example by tying it up with driver's tests
instead of with judgment or conviction."
2 4 Marryott, Automobile Accidents and Financial Responsibility, 287 THE
AXNAwS 83, 84 (May 1953) shows the following figures for the percentage of
total motor vehicles insured in 1950:
a. Old type financial responsibility law requiring no security to satisfy
any judgments rendered, but only proof of future financial responsibility, and
that only after judgment or conviction.
b. Financial responsibility law requiring security, but not proof, fol-
lowing accident.
c. Financial responsibility law requiring both security and proof follow-
ing accident.
d. Massachusetts has a compulsory automobile insurance law.
e. Of the states having less than 50 percent of motor vehicles insured,
Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina had no financial responsibility law
prior to 1952; and Alabama, Georgia, and Montana enacted the moderm type
law after 1950. Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, New Jersey, Ohio, Rhode Is-
land, Texas, Utah, and West Virginia have adopted modern type laws since 1950.
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194325 showed more promise of accident prevention. No new basis
was provided for segregating dangerous drivers and eliminating
them from the highways, but the security feature appeared to pro-
vide a better procedure for making the original approach to this
problem effective. This expectation has been borne out in both the
direct and indirect attacks upon the problem. Following the adop-
tion of security-type safety-responsibility laws, the result has been
an almost immediate increase in the number of driver's li-
censes suspended for failure to comply with the law.28 Also an
immediate upward trend in the percentage of vehicles insured is
noticeable. Typical examples have been cited to show that where
30 to 40 per cent of the total number of registered vehicles are in-
sured prior to the adoption of a security-type law this figure will
increase to around 60 per cent within 90 days after the adoption of
the law and, thence over a period of two to five years the number
of insured drivers will steadily climb to between 85 per cent and
95 per cent of the total.Y
Has this increase in insurance coverage and the greater strict-
ness in license suspension procedures in fact reduced dangerous
driving? Comparison of the traffic accident death statistics for
years before and after the passage of security-type laws in various
states does not reveal any significant increase or decrease in high-
way safety.28 Nor does there appear to have been an upsurge of
safety consciousness in the public. Even in New York where over
95 per cent of the vehicle owners are covered by liability insurance,
the alarming proportions of traffic accident problem apparently
have not been taken seriously by the public.29 Direct evidence
concerning the accident prevention qualities of the Safety-Respon-
sibility Act should however be tempered by logic. Here two ob-
servations are suggested.
First, the sobering effect of having to comply with the "security"
requirement of the law comes immediately upon the report of an
25 In 1943 the National Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances
incorporated into the Uniform Vehicle Code a security-type Safety Respon-
sibility law which had earlier been developed by the American Automobile
Association. The first instance of a security type law appearing in any of the
States was the New Hampshire act of 1937. N.IL LAWS 1937, c. 161, later codi-
fied as N.H. LAws 1942, c. 122.26Note, for example, that in Missouri during the first 90 days following
adoption of a security type law in 1953, the Motor Vehicle Department sus-
pended over 350 drivers' licenses under the authority of the new act. ST.
CHARss (Mo.) BAMN -NEWs, November 6, 1953. For other comments on the
effectiveness of the procedure of the law in Missouri, see THE CoLuzBIA (Mo.)
MissouRiAN, August 11, 1953.27 Correspondence with Harold Phillips, Director of Public Relations, Assn.
of Casualty and Surety Companies, February 25, 1953.
28NATIONAL SAmnIy Couxcm, AccmENT FAcrs (published annually).
29 N.Y. Tnms, February 22, 1954, p. 1.
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accident and does not depend upon a prior judicial or administra-
five determination of liability. Since the penalty for failure to com-
ply with this requirement is suspension of driving privileges, there
is a personal impact upon the individual driver. Later on, as the
process of adjudicating liability continues, the possibility that the
motorist's own financial resources which have been posted as secu-
rity may be taken to pay for lawful claims against him must con-
stantly be considered. If he has shown financial responsibility by
certification of insurance coverage, he may reflect that his own
money may not be at stake, but his chances of ever again obtaining
liability insurance are in jeopardy.
Of course, the effectiveness of these procedures which per-
sonalize the problem of financial responsibility for accidents de-
pend upon the administrative skill and efficiency of the state mo-
tor vehicle officials. If these officials lack either the means or
the know-how to handle the accident cases which are reported to
them, from the initial stages of investigation and assessment of the
proper amount of security to the final stages of compelling the
surrender of registration plates and drivers' licenses of persons
who fail to comply with the law, naturally these procedures will
not be taken seriously by the class of drivers which the community
needs most of all to eliminate from the highways. The fundamental
elements of certainty and uniformity of penalties apply to these ad-
ministrative procedures just as much as they do in the enforcement
of criminal law. Where there has been good and effective admin-
istration, this law has earned from the public a respect which in
turn has bred a sense of social responsibility in individual behavior.
The second point is that the Safety-Responsibility Law is said
to deter dangerous driving indirectly insofar as this deter-
rent effect naturally accompanies the extension of insurance cov-
erage. However, it may be seriously questioned whether this deter-
rent effect is generally felt by the motoring public because such ef-
fect depends upon a realization of the relationship between accident
rates and insurance premium rates, and this realization, once expe-
rienced, having such a strong impact upon the individual driver that
he carries the thought in his mind whenever he is driving. This,
of course, is asking the virtually impossible. The fact is that most
people who think about it do realize that insurance premium rates
are correlated with losses from accidents. But they are neither
shocked nor impressed by this fact to the point of identifying their
own personal driving habits with this very abstract and impersonal
set of statistics. In theory it is of course true that rational human
beings may be more careful if they know that by being careless they
may have to pay more money for their insurance. But the extent
to which highway safety is promoted by this means is surely insig-
nificant.
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There is, however, another aspect of this indirect approach to
the promotion of highway safety which should be noted. Professor
James pointed out that with the steady increase in insurance cov-
erage the insurance companies have increased their efforts to pro-
mote highway safety through education.3 0 This must certainly be
reckoned as a force, extralegal in character, which has appeared in
conjunction with the operation of the Safety-Responsibility Laws.
Accurate analysis of its effect is impossible, however, because the
contribution of the insurance companies to the total campaign of
educational efforts directed toward the promotion of highway safe-
ty cannot be isolated for measurements.
The suggestion that the insurance industry can, if it will, go
far toward personalizing the individual motorist's stake in the total
problem of accident prevention is supported by the experience of
the British insurance industry with their "No-claim Discount."
Essentially this plan provides that in the event of no claim being
made or arising under the policy during the period of insurance
immediately preceding the renewal date the renewal premium shall
be reduced by certain specified percentages. Standard discounts for
the so-called "Tariff Companies" run 10 per cent for the first claim-
free year, 15 per cent for the second, 20 per cent for the third, and
in some cases up to 25 or 33 per cent for the fourth year.31 Such
substantial monetary inducements to maintain accident-free driv-
ing records are thought by British insurers to be a real and con-
tinuing incentive to the individual driver. As one commentator
has put it: "There can be no doubt as to the effect of the discount.
It is mentioned by too many motorists, usually in the form of 'pro-
tecting my no-claims bonus'.... It is in the back of every motor-
ist's mind the whole time. So, although the compulsory insurance
legislation of 1930 might have given the insurance industry an ex-
cuse to get rid of a system that grew up in consideration of compe-
tition, it is realized that its abolition would be resisted strongly."3 2
American insurance underwriting has no real counterpart to this
British plan, for, although there are instances of preferential treat-
.ment of risks, the small amounts of the discounts involved and the
limitations upon their application have failed to impress American
30 James and Dickinson, supra note 15, p. 769.
31 Chalkley, Does the British No-Claim Discount Prevent Accidents, 7
TAmc QuARTERLY 18 (January, 1953).
32 Ibid. p. 24-25. Also note Bennet, Effect of Accident and Cost Trends on
Automobile Insurance Premiums, 3 TRAFIc QuAnTERLY, 334, 337 (October
1949): "The average American motorist takes his automobile liability insurance
for granted. -Ie rarely reads provisions that set forth the protection he is
buying and properly trusting. Only on two occasions does he show interest in
his liability insurance -after an accident and when he pays his insurance
premium."
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
motorists with their personal advantage as individuals in keep-
ing the accident loss ratio of their insurers low.
CoMPnuLSORY INSURANCE
Few proponents of compulsory insurance have attempted to
"sell" this type of legislation with arguments that it directly pro-
motes highway safety.3 3 To attempt to do so is to argue squarely in
the face of contrary appearances. Where the state requires in-
surance as a prerequisite to registration of motor vehicles, insur-
ance companies inevitably are required to underwrite certain
risks which they would not ordinarily accept. Where insurance
is compulsory, an assigned risk plan is necessary, and, as in Massa-
chusetts, a right of appeal from an order denying insurance under
the assigned risk pool. Where such appeals are subject to political
pressure, the charge is made that a number of recognizably unsafe
drivers are kept upon the highways long after their driving records
indicate that they should be denied insurance. Some statistics on
this point are revealing. As reported in the WiscoNsnT LEG sLATIWE
CouNcia's RESEARcH REPORT ON MOTOR VEHCLE AccmENTs, 34 the
Massachusetts Insurance Appeal Board conducted 428 refusal hear-
ings in 1951; insurance companies were sustained only 79 times.
With respect to cancellations for cause, which resulted in 25,011
hearings before the Appeal Board in 1951, insurance companies
were sustained only 909 times. The decision of the Appeal Board
is not final and legal recourse may be had to the Superior Court in
Boston. In 249 cases appealed to the Superior Court in 1951, there
were only 37 reversals. According to the Wisconsin report, "sev-
eral people indicated that considerable political pressure was ap-
plied to members of the Appeal Board. As in the rating process,
there is considerable opportunity for political pressures to influ-
ence decisions.13 r
It has been suggested, however, that this weakness of compul-
sory insurance in its direct appeal to the motorist in the cause of
highway safety is counter-balanced by a corresponding increase in
the indirect influence upon him. Professor James has gone to great
length to explain this as an argument for frank recognition of the
33 1n the hearings held by the Committee on Unsatisfied Judgments and
Compulsory Insurance of the New York State Legislature, February 19, 1954, in
New York, N.Y., even such a long-time campaigner for compulqory insurance
as Superintendent of Insurance Alfred J. Boblinger stated that in his opinion
the existence of compulsory insurance could have no effect upon the problem
of highway safety. Also see N.Y. DAiLY Nsws, February 26, 1954, p. 28.
Others have attempted to argue that there is some deterrent effect upon
dangerous driving, or at least that compulsory insurance does not increase
carelessness on the highway. See 27 Mnw. L. Rzv. 103, 112 (1942).34 Vol. II, Pt. 2, 104-105.
35 Ibid.
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need for "social insurance" to meet the automobile accident problem
in the same way that the industrial accident problem was met.
The gist of the argument has already been referred to in connec-
tion with the indirect effects of the Safety-Responsibility Law;
that is, a greater share of the responsibility for paying the costs
of automobile accidents may be placed upon the insurance compa-
nies with complete confidence that they, in turn, will react to their
own self-interests and conduct more vigorous and extensive cam-
paigns of highway safety among their insured clients.86
This confidence is not altogether well placed, for although it
correctly assumes that the insurance carriers will react (as their
record shows they have reacted) by every means at their disposal to
minimie their loss ratios, it does not accurately estimate the hu-
man nature of the individual motorist. Here the evidence is again
not as complete as might be desired, but if one regards financial
responsibility as evidencing a sense of social responsibility toward
other drivers on the road and the highway safety problem in gen-
eral, then the experience in Massachusetts is not reassuring. Massa-
chusetts has the lowest percentage of excess limit policies of any
state in the nation.37 This suggests that any plan which is compul-
sory inevitably generates hostility on the part of the public. Com-
pulsory insurance has forced 99 per cent of the public to carry min-
imum liability insurance, but has not inspired any general feeling
of responsibility to go further and provide themselves with cover-
age beyond those minimum limits. The analogy which this suggests
is clear: since compulsory insurance fails to evoke anything fur-
ther than compliance with the minimum legal requirements of fi-
nancial responsibility, it must surely have the same leveling effect
upon the concomitant feeling of social responsibility among drivers
on the highway. Any general adoption of this tendency to rest upon
the minimum standards of driving safety would be a damaging dis-
service to the fight against highway accidents.
Against this evidence that compulsory insurance not only fails
to make any significant contribution to the promotion of highway
safety but actually tends to work against it, one outstanding ques-
tion remains to be answered: If compulsory insurance has this ef-
fect, why does Massachusetts have such a good record of accident
prevention?38 It is suggested that the answer to this question lies
in the effectiveness of its driver licensing law, its driver improve-
36 James, Accident Liability Reconsidered, 57 YALE L. J. 549, 557 (1947).
-37 Rnoar o WIscoNsIN L rGISLATIV COUNCIL ON MoroR Vsncu Acci-
DENTS, VoL II, Pt. 1, p. 52.
-3SNATioNA. Sar ETY CouxciL, AccIDENT FACTS, shows that throughout the
period since World War 11 Massachusetts has been among the top three in the
list of states having the lowest percentage of traffic deaths per 100,000 miles
traveled.
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ment program and the intelligent law enforcement program of the
state.39 These forces have borne home to the motorist in direct
fashion the lesson of'highway safety. It is suggested that these fac-
tors rather than compulsory insurance have been responsible for
what success Massachusetts has achieved in the promotion of high-
way safety.
UNSATISFIED JUDGMENT FuND LAWS
Unsatisfied Judgment Funds are the most recent competitors
to enter the field of plans for solving the "social problem" of com-
pensation of automobile accident victims. Legislation of this type,
beginning with the example of Manitoba and Prince Edward Islands
in 1945, has become fairly common in Canada and has found ex-
pression in the North Dakota Law of 1947 and the New Jersey Law
of 1952.4 0
There is no need to go into the details of the manner in which
the New Jersey or North DakotaUnsatisfied JudgmentFundLaws 4 '
work for this legislation does not purport to improve highway safe-
ty. It is frankly and exclusively a device for providing compensa-
tion in cases which would not be compensated under either the
Safety-Responsibility Law or compulsory insurance legislation 42
Unsatisfied judgment funds are frequently spoken of as the logical
way to supplement Safety-Responsibility and compulsory insurance
laws. By this means, it is said, the cases in which victims cannot be
3 9 Indicative of the emphasis placed upon these phases of the total campaign
to promote highway safety in Massachusetts are the amounts of money spent
annually by the state for "driver improvement" work. The Wisconsin Legis-
lative Council's study notes that "Wisconsin's driver improvement program is
not doing an effective job at the present time because of lack of qualified per-
sonnel and money. Wisconsin spends about 2 cents per driver per year for
driver improvement. Other states that have good accident records, such as
Connecticut and Massachusetts, spend as much as $1.00 per driver per year."
Vol. II, Pt. 1, p. 21.
40 MAN1r OA PEV. STAT. 1949, c. 93, §128 (L).
Pi i c ED. ISLAND LAWS 1945, c. 17.
ALBERTA LAWS 1947, c. 11.
BRrTisH CoLmiA LAws 1947, c. 62.
N.D. REv. STATo, c. 39, § 1701-1710.
OxTAmo REV. STATS. 1950. 167, § 97-109.
N.J. LAws 1952, c. 174.
41Marryott, supra, note 23; Pearson and Kline, THE PoBLEM OF THE Uw-
INSuRED MOTORIST: A REPoRT By THE INsuRANcE DEPARTmENT, STATE OF NEw YoRx
(November 1951); Bergesen, A. R., The North Dakota Unsatisied Judgment
Fund, 3 EDERATION OF INsuRANcE CouNSEL QUARTEmY 35 (January 1953).
42 In an effort to devise social legislation which will overcome the admin-
istrative weaknesses present in the Canadian and North Dakota statutes, the
present New Jersey Unsatisfied Judgment Fund Act may have features which
are subect to challenge on constitutional grounds. For discussion of these
questions see Marryott, supra, note 23; and Wise, Which Road for the Insured
Motorist, 3 FEDERATION OF INSuRA/cE CousEL QUARTRLY 29 (July 1953).
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assured of compensation under those laws will have recourse to a
fund provided by contributions from the entire motoring public.
Undoubtedly this would be the result, but, it is submitted, there
could be no gain in highway safety attributable to such
legislation. It would seem that the psychological effect of such laws
upon the individual motorist would lead to a minimizing of the
standards of social responsibility for good driving rather than in-
creasing the individual's sense of personal responsibility for main-
taining the highest possible standards of safety.
HIGHWAY SAFY AND LICENSING PROCEDURES
It has been stated by those who devote their full attention to
administering the motor vehicle laws that "for the money spent, and
in the long run, no other activity will control accidents so well as a
good driver license law well administered." 43 Coming from those
state officials who are most usually responsible for administering
both the driver licensing and financial responsibility laws, this
choice of weapons for the fight against highway accidents deserves
serious consideration. It suggests that the most effective way to
build up the individual motorist's standards of social responsibility
in his behavior on the highway is to put that motorist's privilege
to drive in danger of forfeiture whenever his conduct is dangerous,
regardless of whether such danger causes an accident or is merely
a violation of the rules of the road.44 This shifts the emphasis of
the attack from being primarily concerned with the "social prob-
lem of the uncompensated victim to the personal problem of the un-
safe driver and the means by which he can be made a safe driver.
Of course, driver licensing laws have existed for many years,
during all of which time the automobile accident problem has
grown worse rather than better. Therefore the mere threat of li-
cense suspension following a certain number of convictions seems to
have been no more successful in making people drive safely than has
the similar threat with respect to unsatisfied judgments under the
Safety-Responsibility Law. More realistic as a means of reaching
the heart of the problem is the suggestion that a driver improve-
ment program, conducted as an integral part of the driver licensing
law, will provide the most effective means of preventing accidents.
Underlying such a suggestion is the premise that removing the driv-
er from the road is not sufficient; he must be taught or persuaded
to be a better driver.
Driver improvement programs are generally based upon ad-
ministrative regulations promulgated by the State Commissioner
of Motor Vehicles or his counterpart. Founded upon the statutory
4 3 BA=-m, Divmr IzwRoV~m=T THROUGH LICENsInG PRocmums, p. 11,
(Washington, 1950).
44 See in this regard Brandoleone, Deterninig Unsafe Drivers Before the
Accident, 86 ComnmcmL CAR JoumlAL 68 (September 1953).
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authority to suspend and revoke drivers' licenses for cause, such
programs require no further basis in statutory legislation. Essential-
ly the machinery for driver improvement takes the form of (1) a
"safety point scoring system" in which a motorist's record of unsafe
driving is reflected as it develops over a period of time, (2) a
series of tests administered to the motorist who builds up a certain
specified point score, which tests reveal the causes of the individu-
al's bad driving record, (3) rehabilitation measures based upon the
driver's weaknesses as shown in his tests, and (4) suspension or
revocation of driving privileges of those individuals who do not
respond to rehabilitative measures. By this procedure, it is thought
that the threat of driver license suspension will not be an empty
one, either from the standpoint of the respect which the motor-
ing public has for this law or from the standpoint of the result-
ing elimination of the accident-prone and accident-causing members
of the motoring public.
Unfortunately there is not much experience by which to test
this high expectation. Some evidence comes from Manitoba where
a form of driver improvement program has existed since 1951.4 5
During this period the Province had roughly 218,000 licensed driv-
ers. During the period of 1951 when the program was in effect,
more than 17,000 drivers acquired points against their record. How-
ever, of this number it was necessary to suspend only 715 licenses
because of bad driving records. All but a few of those suspend-
ed were granted probationary licenses after successfully completing
the test and satisfying the Examiner that improvement had begun.
Only six motorists were suspended a second time because they failed
to improve. This apparently successful effort at analysis and re-
habilitation has resulted in a marked reduction of accidents in
Manitoba.4 0
Experience under the District of Columbia's driver improve-
ment program also gives reason to place confidence in the effec-
tiveness of rehabilitation for unsafe drivers. Under this procedure,
revocation of driving privileges results from the accumulation of
12 points within a 3-year period. However, continuing efforts to
improve the driver are made as points increase. At 3 points, a
warning letter is sent to the driver. At 5 points, the driver is
4S WiscoNsn LEGisLAT E COUNCIL, supra, note 37, VoL A1 Pt. 2, pp. 51-53.
46 The followving record of accidents in the Great Winnipeg area between
1950 and 1951 indicates the extent of improvement capable. During this period
there was a 14.3% reduction of fatal accidents, a 24.5% reduction of non-
fatal accidents, and an 11.9% reduction of all accidents. In 1952 the trend
continued with respective reductions of 16.7%, 3.6% and 17.5%. At the same
time accidents throughout the rest of the province were increasing. During
1952, Manitoba accidents (excluding Winnipeg) rose 18.2%, 32.4%, and 4.3%.
The difference is attributed to the effectiveness of the driver improvement pro-
gram in Winnipeg. Ibid.
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called for a personal conference with motor vehicle department
officials at which time driving records and habits are reviewed.
At 8 points, driving privileges are suspended for from 2 to 15 days.
By these progressive steps, D. C. officials believe they have found
a valuable means of discovering and correcting unsafe driving hab-
its. Their authority permits them to use not only revocation, but
suspension, various forms of conditional licensing, psychological
testing, and education in their efforts to deal with dangerous driv-
ers.
47
Initially, the D. C. point system required the entry of points
upon the police report of an arrest, regardless of what disposition
was made of the charge by the traffic courts. It was the opinion
that an arrest was evidence of apparent public danger and that all
too often cases were not successfully prosecuted because of legal
technicalities which returned dangerous drivers back into the
stream of traffic. By way of clarification of the administrative
powers of motor vehicle officials acting under this point system,
however, it has been judicially decided that deprivation of driving
privileges must be based upon notice and hearing before compe-
tent administrative officers or else following court conviction under
statutes providing for mandatory revocation.48
A program of driver improvement conducted by the New Jer-
sey Division of Motor Vehicles has been in existence for less than
two years.49 But already certain interesting conclusions may be
drawn concerning the causes of accidents and the rehabilitation of
those who cause them. Into the New Jersey accident prevention
clinic were directed motorists who had accumulated 12 points or
more over a 3-year period, accident repeaters, twice convicted
drunken drivers, fatal accident operators, assigned risk insurance
cases and driver license re-examination cases. Reported findings as
to this group of motorists are at present confined to the point
system violators since members of the other groups are not suffi-
ciently numerous to warrant generalizations. It was found that
the point system violators were on the average involved in roughly
five times more accidents than the average New Jersey driver.
Yet these point system violators did not differ significantly from
the "normal cross-section" of the rest of the population with respect
to such socio-economic factors as age, amount of education, marital
47Keneipp, The Traffic Point System as Used in the District of Co-
lumbia, 8 TRAFFc QUARTERLY 235 (April 1954).48 Wilson v. Spencer, et. al., No. 5464-53, decided Dec. 5, 1953, U. S. Dist. Ct.
(DC).
4 9 Described in address of Win. J. Dearden, Director, New Jersey Division
of Motor Vehicles, entitled "Report on the New Jersey Accident Prevention
Clinic," delivered to the Annual Meeting, American Assoc. of Motor Vehicle
Administrators, Richmond, Va., October 19, 1953.
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status and income. In these respects, they were ordinary people.
Moreover, their physiological characteristics did not distinguish
the violators from the accident-free and violation-free drivers. In
traffic law knowledge tests 88% of the point system violators scored
80% or better, indicating that such knowledge bears little relation-
ship to the causes of accidents within such a group. Psychological
tests however indicated that driving attitudes made the difference
between safe and unsafe drivers. Although the results of these tests
encourage the belief that chronic violators and accident repeaters
tend to be marginally adjusted, they cannot be described as neurotic.
In most cases commission of a traffic violation aroused no sense of
moral guilt in the make-up of the average violator. The same driv-
er whose conscience restrained his violation of other criminal laws
seemed to attach no moral guilt to violations of the motor vehicle
and traffic laws unless or until death or serious injury resulted from
a violation.
The explanation of this success where other types of legisla-
tion have failed would seem to be clear in the light of what has
been said throughout the foregoing discussion concerning the psy-
chology of driving, the causes of accidents, and the methods of
various types of legislation seeking to have an effect upon these
causes of accidents. In his annual report for 1952, the Director of
the Division of Motor Vehicles of the State of New Jersey pointed
directly to this key to success. He states: "After six months of op-
eration the point system has materially altered the thinking of
New Jersey motorists. Where they used to think in terms of dol-
lars in relation to traffic fines, they now think in terms of points.
The impact of this change thinking on the safety consciousness of
the motoring public has been tremendous and will continue to
expand in the years ahead."50
It would seem that the administrator of the law is here point-
ing out the great effectiveness possessed by legislation which em-
phasizes the personal responsibility of the individual for his own
misconduct. Under the point system, this personal responsibility is
not represented by a series of separate and isolated situations, in
each of which the individual has been called to account and had the
penalty for his guilt satisfied by the payment of a fine. Rather, the
individual motorist's personal responsibility is a cumulative mat-
ter, in which violations of the law and instances of dangerous driv-
ing cannot be forgotten as quickly as a fine can be paid or an in-
surance company can arrive at a settlement of claims. Thus the
deterrent effect of the ultimate penalty of a license suspension or
revocation is constantly impressed upon the consciousness of the
individual motorist. The impact is direct, and it contains a message
So 47TH ARNuAL REPORT OF DIECoR, DIMSIoN OF MOTOR VEHICLEs, p. 15
(1952).
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which does not require any special knowledge or intellectual abili-
ty to understand. In all these respects, the drivers' license law-driv-
er improvement program approach to the problem of accident pre-
vention reveals advantages not seen in the other types of legisla-
tion which have here been discussed.
CONCLUSIONS
The great proportion of highway accidents is caused by the
particular driving behavior of the operators of the motor vehicles
involved. Yet the driving behavior of the motoring public has gen-
erally defied classification and analysis in any way that will per-
mit a constructive legislative program for promoting highway safe-
ty. This is because the progressive simplification of the operations
involved in driving motor vehicles has made driving all but a
matter of pure habit. Today one may drive with almost the same
degree of detachment from conscious attention to what he is doing
as when he is walking along a street. Psychologically, therefore,
driving practices are largely beyond the reach of statutory standards
of conduct, which at their best affect only that part of human be-
havior arising from deliberate and conscious response to the stim-
ulus of environment and events. Moreover, whenever the normal
psychological equipment which an individual motorist must rely up-
on to control his driving behavior is impaired or subject to inherent
weaknesses, additional obstacles are raised against the penetrating
effect of the legislative mandate.
Because the psychological factors involved in driving are so dif-
ficult to reach through legislation, most existing statutes and admin-
istrative procedures dealing with motor vehicle accidents have had
only slightly deterrent effect upon dangerous driving which causes
accidents. Moreover, in proportion to the degree to which the em-
phasis of such legislation is placed on "the social problem" of com-
pensating the accident victim, these laws and procedures have
tended to lose what deterrent effect they have had upon unsafe
driving practices. It should be axiomatic that if the ultimate pur-
pose of legislation is to prevent automobile accidents, it must make
its effect felt directly upon the unsafe driver, for he is the key to
the entire chain of events leading up to the accident. For this
reason compulsory insurance, unsatisfied judgment funds, and
steps toward the development of tort liability theories which rest
upon social insurance or a right to compensation regardless of
causation all labor under an initial and fundamental disadvantage
with respect to their deterrent effect upon accident-causing driving
behavior. To a certain extent Safety-Responsibility laws also oper-
ate under this unfavorable balance of factors. But insofar as they
actually do succeed in segregating the dangerous and accident-
prone drivers and eliminating them from the highways, these laws
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work for basic improvement in the composition of the motoring
public. And insofar as a sense of social responsibility is concomitant
to a sense of financial responsibility, these laws appear to have
induced widespread acceptance by individual motorists of a per-
sonal responsibility for both the social problem of compensating the
accident victim and the more basic problem of preventing the
causes of accidents.
Throughout the entire comparison of various types of legis-
lation as they relate to highway safety, the effect of insurance is
felt. Yet the role of insurance in molding individual driving prac-
tices is an enigma. Where insurance coverage exists, the individual
driver probably is not nearly so much impressed by the relation-
ship between his premium and his carrier's loss ratio as he is by
the knowledge that he has shifted to his insurance company the
financial liability for future injuries and damages attributable to
him. The direct impact of insurance upon the individual driver
may, therefore, reduce highway safety-consciousness. This has
led some to say that the most effective role of insurance in pro-
moting highway safety is an indirect one, finding expression in the
safety education campaigns conducted by the insurance industry
and the accident prevention work done by motor vehicle fleet op-
erators seeking ways to minimize their insurance costs. Within
their limitations these extralegal procedures have their most sig-
nificant effect upon the driving habits of the motoring public. It
would be desirable, of course, if the efforts which have been made
to rationalize the self-interest of the mass of motorists in reducing
their premiums through prevention of accidents could be personal-
ized for the individual driver. In this respect the British "No-claim
Discount" may recommend itself to greater imitation by American
underwriters and to serious consideration by American legislators.
The comparison of civil statutory and administrative techniques
for deterring dangerous driving practices suggests that none of the
existing forms of legislation holds as much promise as does the
technique of selective driver licensing coupled with a program of
driver improvement. No other form of law is more successful
in discovering and segregating the dangerous and accident-prone
driver. No other procedure is more direct in reaching, with last-
ing and personal impact, the psychological factors involved in
driving and in the causes of accidents. Constitutional and legis-
lative problems involved in such plans are negligible, and for the
time and money invested in administrative processing, no other
system has yielded greater improvement in highway safety. Where
such administrative procedures are now being used, they have
shown themselves to be a natural supplement to Safety-Responsibil-
ity laws in their efforts to eliminate reckless and irresponsible driv-
ers. Where driver improvement has been used in conjunction with
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compulsory insurance it has gone far in counteracting the inevitable
failure of that system to instill a feeling of individual responsibility
for highway safety. These signs of promise are welcome, and point
out at least one definite course by which civil penalties, operating
through statutory and administrative procedures, can make a posi-
tive contribution to the promotion of highway safety.
